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As North Korea’s latest rocket-missile launch approaches, there is speculation whether 
Beijing can halt Pyongyang’s missile ambitions. In my view, Beijing will turn a blind eye 
towards North Korea’s latest provocation, while simultaneously calling for restraint by all 
parties. Recently, the China-North Korea “blood alliance,” a concept of allies that 
originated during the Korean War, has been renewed, and it is in China’s interests that 
North Korea consolidates its “absolute deterrence” capability to deter US forces in the 
region. 
 
North Korea’s late leader, Kim Jong-il, broke diplomatic protocol when he made three 
trips to China within twelve months—May and August 2010, and May 2011. During this 
period, Kim further solidified his strategic decision to turn towards China for the survival 
of his regime by virtually abandoning the North Korean policy of Juche—an ideology of 
national self-reliance devised by his late father Kim Il-sung. The intensive interaction 
between Beijing and Pyongyang in the past few years suggests that China and North Korea 
both seek to reconfirm their blood alliance, notwithstanding occasional disagreements on 
certain economic issues. Chinese President Hu Jintao met twice with Kim Jong-il in 2010 
amidst the controversy of the sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, and the 
US government’s announcement of broadened sanctions in response. Furthermore, it was 
beyond normal protocol for Hu to personally travel to the north-eastern Chinese city of 
Changchun to greet Kim and his son Kim Jong-un during their secretive August 2010 trip. 
This was when the elder Kim reportedly stated North Korea’s “in-depth experience of the 
preciousness…of the friendship created by older generations [Mao Zedong and Kim  
Il-sung] of revolutionaries of both countries.”  
 
Today, Changchun is the provincial capital of China’s Jilin province, which acts as the 
lifeline for supplying Chinese economic aid to North Korea. The city also has special 
symbolic significance; Changchun was developed by Imperial Japan in the 1930s as the 
capital and industrial center of Manchuria, and according to Pyongyang the late Kim  
Il-sung started his anti-Japanese rebellion there. The ancient Koguryo/Goguryeo 
Kingdom, according to Koreans, was also founded in this area, which recently the Chinese 
have been claiming as “an inalienable part of China.” Presumably, this is aimed at securing 
historical justification for communist China’s right to intervene in the event of North 
Korea’s collapse. 
 
These extraordinary summit meetings in 2010 amidst international criticism condemning 
North Korea’s aggression are clear signals that China, at that time, endorsed Kim Jong-un 
as Kim Jong-il’s heir apparent, as is the protocol of a suzerain with a vassal tributary. 
Evidently the two regimes share the “military-first policy,” in that the communist party’s 
political monopoly in both states is secured by the military. Clearly, the People’s 
Liberation Army and the Korean People’s Army are not playing the same role in state life 
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as the national armies of western states; their real role is to serve the communist party 
dictatorships in China and North Korea. This is where the iron ruling power of Chinese 
and North Korean communist dictatorship lies, and such an institutional trait is an 
essential shared value inside the China-North Korea blood alliance.  
 
North Korea is virtually a failed state surviving entirely by relying on Chinese support. 
China fervently opposed economic sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations 
Security Council following the North Korean missile test-firing in April 2009, and 
second nuclear test in May 2009. China also blocked any tough measures against North 
Korea following the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island in 2010. 
In spite of stricter UN sanctions in 2009 banning the export of weapons and luxury 
goods to North Korea, China’s export of luxury goods to North Korea has significantly 
increased. In addition, Chinese ports and airspace provide safe channels for North 
Korea’s export of arms and sensitive WMD-related technology to states of concern such 
as Iran.  
 
The Six-Party Talks framework is a Chinese trick to muddle through the North Korean 
nuclear crisis without jeopardizing the North Korean regime. In fact, through the Six-
Party Talks process, North Korea was granted sufficient time to prepare for its nuclear 
tests and to establish itself as a de facto nuclear weapon state. Furthermore, this is based on 
the shared conviction of both Pyongyang and Beijing that nuclear weapons are the 
absolute deterrence against the threat of a US attack. This conviction originates from 
Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung’s shared fear of a US nuclear attack during the Korean 
War. Consequently, Beijing and Pyongyang’s statements after their first nuclear tests, in 
October 1964 and October 2006, respectively, are basically identical. Both claimed that 
“the US nuclear threats compelled us to develop nuclear weapons.”  
 
Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese military has been 
consistent in supporting a nuclear-armed North Korea for China’s own strategic benefits. 
As Shen Dingli frequently asserts: “North Korea reduces the military pressure China 
faces from the United States in the contingency of Taiwanese independence” and “North 
Korea’s bold move to develop nuclear weapons is also to make war on the Korean 
peninsula more unlikely.” Taking this into account, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s 
remarks condemning North Korea’s nuclear tests were rather misleading, if not 
deceptive. China’s ultimate interest is to maintain North Korea as a hermit state, subject 
to Beijing’s influence. 
 
Previously, in Asia Pacific Bulletin No. 122, I argued that China’s current strategy toward 
North Korea is similar to Imperial Japan’s Manchukuo policy in the 1930s with regards 
to: 1) Large investment in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources, 2) 
Military interventions for protecting economic interests, and 3) Social-political 
absorption by supporting a puppet government. This sophisticated strategy of “stealth 
imperialism” is employed by a relatively weak latecomer imperial state trying to secure 
its own interests by avoiding direct confrontation with existing imperial powers.  
 
For China, the quasi-Manchukuo strategy is the most cost-effective way to maximize its 
strategic gains. One of China’s major, yet hidden, strategic goals would be to secure naval 
access to the North Korean ports of Rason, Seonbong, and Wonsan, which are gateways 
to the Sea of Japan, while simultaneously expanding Dandong port to command the 
Bohai Bay and the Yellow Sea. Are these examples of Chinese attempts to build 
“Gwadar” port facilities in North Korea? Was North Korea’s offensive behavior 
throughout 2010, along with ongoing increased aggression by Chinese “fishing” boats 
against Japan and South Korea, part of China’s increasingly belligerent and imperialistic 
behavior in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea? Either way, North Korea’s 
forthcoming long-range missile test perfectly serves China’s grand strategy. 
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